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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
THOMAS SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010856-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001), where the defendant in a district court criminal case may 
take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first 
degree or capital felony offense. In the underlying criminal case, Appellant Thomas 
Smith was convicted of two counts of tax evasion for the year 1995. The counts were 
entered as separate second and third degree felony offenses, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-1101(1) (1995). A copy of the original judgment entered in the case on September 7, 
2001, is attached hereto as Addendum A (the "Original Judgment"). 
On September 25, 2001, standby counsel for Smith filed a notice of appeal from 
the Original Judgment. This Court designated that appeal as State v. Smith. Case No. 
20010817-CA ("Case No. 20010817"). Case No. 20010817 is separate from the appeal in 
this matter. The appeal here is from a final order, dated September 26, 2001, imposing 
restitution against Smith (the "September 26 Order"). A copy of the September 26 Order 
is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this case are as follows: 
1. Whether a notice of appeal, filed on September 25,2001, divested the trial 
court of jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution against Smith on September 26,2001. 
Standard of Review: This Court will decide an issue of jurisdiction as a matter of 
law. See Security Inv. Ltd v. Brown. 2002 UT App 131,1f8,47 P.3d 97: see also State in 
the Interest of B.B.. 2002 UT App 82, f*f 45 P.3d 527; State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, f39, 
37 P.3d 1073 (filing of notice of appeal divested trial court of jurisdiction in the matter). 
2. Whether the trial court violated Smith's due process rights by entering the 
September 26 Order of restitution in Smith's absence and without a hearing. 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial judge has properly sentenced a defendant in 
his absence is an issue that is reviewed for correctness, without deference to the trial 
court. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996). 
3. Whether the trial court's September 26 Order of restitution violated Utah case 
law and statutory law. 
Standard of Review: "Generally '[w]e will not disturb a trial court's order of 
restitution unless the "trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its 
discretion."'" State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App.1997), cert denied. 
953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997) (cite omitted). Also, the restitution statute provides a 
defendant with the right to a full hearing on restitution issues. This Court will determine 
2 
as a matter of law whether the trial court disregarded that statute. See State v. 
Westerman. 945 P.2d 695,696 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Court affords no deference to trial 
court in construing application of restitution statute); see also State v. Starnes. 841 P.2d 
712, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (trial court misapplied the statute in denying defendant full 
hearing relating to restitution order). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issues on appeal in this case are preserved in the record at 898-907. In 
addition, the issues here concern the legality of a post-judgment order imposing 
restitution against Smith. Restitution is a sentencing issue. This Court may consider the 
legality of a sentence even where the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e) (2002); State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions will be determinative of 
the issues on appeal: 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 22 (2002). 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 81(e) (2002). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999). 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached Addendum C. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below. 
A complete statement of the case is set forth in a separate but related appeal, Case 
No. 20010817-CA. (See Brief of Appellant, Case No. 20010817, "Statement of the 
Case.11)1 As set forth in Case No. 20010817, Smith was convicted by a jury of two 
counts of felony tax evasion for the year 1995. (See R. 589-92.) On September 7, 2001, 
the trial judge sentenced Smith to a suspended prison term for each count and ordered 
him to serve 36 months probation (the "Original Judgment"). (R. 861-63.) 
1 An appeal from the underlying criminal case is already pending before this Court. It is 
identified as State v. Smith, Case No. 20010817-CA. Case No. 20010817 is separate 
from but related to this matter. Case No. 20010817 concerns trial errors, while the appeal 
in this Case No. 20010856 concerns a post-judgment restitution order. 
Since the separate appeals arise from the same trial court criminal case, they share 
a record on appeal. Specifically, Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides 
that the record on appeal shall consist of "[a]ll of the papers" in the criminal case, 
including the "original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 11(a) 
and (d) (2002). Also, the rule requires "[a] single record to be transmitted" to this Court 
for purposes of appeal. Id at 11(c). In that regard, the original record in this matter is 
designated as Case No. 20010817. 
As a convenience to the parties and Court, the clerk's office has prepared a set of 
select documents from Case No. 20010817 that relates specifically to this appeal. Those 
documents are contained in a folder identified as Case No. 20010856. The papers in the 
folder are identified by their original page number in Case No. 20010817. 
Since Case No. 20010817 and this matter share a record on appeal, standby coun-
sel for Smith has made reference herein to the record in Case No. 20010817. In addition, 
standby counsel has made reference to the Brief of Appellant on record with this Court in 
Case No. 20010817. See Utah R. Evid. 201 (2002); In the Interest of S.J.. 576 P.2d 
1280, 1283 (Utah 1978) (recognizing that court may take judicial notice of matters 
already in the record in related proceedings); Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (court may take judicial notice of the record and prior proceedings in the 
same case). 
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Fourteen days after entry of the Original Judgment, on September 21,2001, the 
state filed a "Motion to Clarify Sentencing Order." (R. 881-83.) Among other things, the 
state asked the trial court to impose restitution against Smith in the amount of $6,105.94. 
04) 
On September 25,2001, standby counsel for Smith filed a notice of appeal from 
the Original Judgment. (R. 888-89.) Thereafter, on September 26,2001, the trial court 
entered an order granting the state's September 21 motion and imposing restitution 
against Smith in the amount of $6,105.94. (R. 896-897.) The order was entered without 
a hearing. 
On September 28, Smith filed an objection to the order. (R. 898-907.) Nothing 
came of that objection. Since the time for filing a notice of appeal from the September 26 
Order was approaching, Smith filed a Notice of Appeal for this matter on October 22, 
2001. (R. 923-24.) In this appeal, Smith maintains that the trial court erred in entering 
the September 26 Order of restitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A complete statement of the facts is set forth in the related appeal, Case No. 
20010817. (See Brief of Appellant, Case No. 20010817, "Statement of Facts"); supra 
note 1, herein. In summary, on October 12,1999, the state charged Smith with two 
counts of felony tax evasion for the year 1995. (R. 1-2.) Smith represented himself in 
the trial court proceedings with Salt Lake Legal Defender Association serving as standby 
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counsel. (See R. 193-94; 214-283; 324; 408-412.) On April 9, 2001 the trip1 court 
commenced a jury trial in the case. (R. 490-91; 549-50;:. i-54.) At the conclusion of 
the three-day trial, the jury found Smith guilty as charged. (R. 589-92.) 
On September 7, 2001, the trial judge conducted a sentencing hearing. Smith, 
standby counsel, and the state prosecutor attended the hearing and presented argument to 
the trial iage as it related to sentencing in the underlying criminal matter. (R. 959.) At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the j , dge entered the Original Judgment against Smith. (R. 
861-63.) Thereafter, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal for Case No. 20010817. (R. 
888-89). That appeal relates to the rulings of the lower court in the trial proceedings. 
(See Brief of Appellant, Case No. 20010817, dated May 24, 2002.) 
On September 21, the state filed a motion with the trial court, requesting, inter 
alia, the imposition of restitution against Smith. The state mailed a copy of the motion to 
Smith at his Vernal address and forwarded a copy to standby counsel. (R. 881-83.) On 
September 26, 2001, without a hearing, the trial court granted the state's request and 
entered an order imposing restitution against Smith. (R. 896-97, |^4.) 
On September 28, Smith filed a written "Objection to Proposed Order." (R. 898-
907.) A copy of the objection is attached hereto as Addendum D. In the objection, 
Smith argued that the trial court Mlack[ed] jurisdiction to grant the relief requested" for 
various reasons. (R. 898.) Smith advised the trial court that if it denied the slate's 
proposed order "summarily," "no hearing" would be "needed." (R. 898.) 
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Smith also made reference in the objection to a tax provision, and a "Notice of 
Deficiency" that he received from the Utah State "Tax Commission regarding taxes due 
for 1995." (R. 901.) Where the Notice of Deficiency alleged a specific amount in taxes 
due for 1995, Smith disagreed with that amount, and noted that he had the right to 
"Request a Division Conference" or to file a petition. (R. 902.) Smith argued that if the 
court granted the proposed order as it related to the amount in taxes due, "such order 
would negate the Notice of Deficiency in its entirety and the Defendant's right to due 
process under the terms and conditions of the Notice of Deficiency." (Id.) 
Smith concluded the written objection by stating the following: 
Thus, as shown above the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the proposed order 
and/or to proceed to or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or to order the 
Defendant to do anything and must therefore and can SUMMARILY deny the 
proposed order in its entirety and no hearing is needed. 
(R. 902.) 
When the trial court did not respond to the objection, and the time for filing the 
notice of appeal was scheduled to expire, Smith filed the notice of appeal for this matter. 
(R. 923-24 (Notice of Appeal, dated October 22,2001).) Additional facts relating to this 
appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On September 7, 2001, the trial court in this case conducted a sentencing hearing. 
During the hearing, the court entered judgment against Smith, and sentenced him to a 
suspended prison term and 36 months probation. On September 21, fourteen days after 
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entry of the Original Judgment, the state filed a "Motion to Clarify Sentencing Order." In 
the motion, the state requested for the first time mat the trial court impose restitution 
against Smith. Thereafter, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. 
The state's "Motion to Clarify" was mislabeled. It may be more properly 
characterized as a motion to alter or amend, where the state was seeking an order to 
materially change the Original Judgment by imposing restitution against Smith. 
According to the rules, a party must file a motion to alter or amend within 10 days 
of the entry of judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) (2002). An untimely motion to alter 
or amend must be denied, Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982) ("When 
such an untimely motion is made, the trial court's only alternative is to deny the motion"), 
and will not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) 
(2002) (if a "timely motion" to amend is filed, the time for filing an appeal shall run from 
the order granting/denying the motion). 
The state's September 21 motion was untimely. Nevertheless, the trial court 
granted the motion on Sentember 26, 2001, and imposed restitution against Smith in the 
amount of $6,105.94. (R. 897, ^ 4.) The trial court entered the order of restitution 
after Smith filed the notice of appeal. 
The trial court erred in entering the September 26 Order in several respects: First, 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order after Smith filed a timely notice of 
appeal. The notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction in the matter. The 
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September 26 Order should be vacated as null and void. 
Second, the trial court entered the September 26 Order in Smith's absence. That 
was error. A criminal defendant's right to be present at all stages of trial includes the 
right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1109-11. Restitution is part 
of sentencing. State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241,1244 (Utah 1980) ("A court may sentence 
a defendant... to pay restitution"). The restitution sentence imposed here was illegal. It 
must be vacated pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Finally, the September 26 Order of restitution was entered in violation of Utah 
statutory law, case law, and due process law. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(e) (1999), when Smith objected to the matter, the trial court was required to give 
him an evidentiary hearing on restitution. In addition, the trial court was required to 
consider specific factors set forth at § 76-3-20l(8)(c) before ordering restitution. In this 
case, the trial court failed to provide an evidentiary hearing. It also failed to consider the 
factors as required by § 76-3-20 l(8)(c). Thus, the September 26 Order was unlawful. It 
must be vacated. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201; Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER 
THE SEPTEMBER 26 ORDER. 
A. THIS COURT MAY REACH THE ISSUES ON APPEAL IN THIS CASE 
UNDER RULE 22(e). UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal defendant 
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may ask this Court for the first time on appeal to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2002); Brooks. 908 P.2d at 859 
(finding that Rule 22(e) permits an appellate court to consider the legality of a sentence 
even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal). 
Restitution is part of sentencing. Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244 ("A court may 
sentence a defendant... to pay restitution"). If a trial court imposes restitution in 
violation of the Utah rules, Utah statutory law, Utah case law, or federal constitutional 
law, this Court may vacate that part of sentencing illegal, even if the issue is raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
In this case restitution was imposed in an illegal manner. Smith may obtain relief 
from that part of sentencing for the first time on appeal pursuant to Rule 22(e). 
B. A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL DIVESTED THE TRIAL COURT OF 
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE STATE'S UNTIMELY MOTION. THE 
TRIAL COURT'S SEPTEMBER 26 ORDER OF RESTITUTION MUST BE 
VACATED. 
1. The Rules That Govern the Filing of a Notice of Appeal Contain Specific Time 
Limitations. 
Pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah R. App. P., a party may take an appeal from a final 
order or judgment in the district court. Utah R. App. P. 3(a) (2002). Under Rule 4, the 
party taking the appeal must file a notice of appeal "within 30 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (2002). 
The 30-day time limit for filing an appeal is jurisdictional. See State v. Montoya. 
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825 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It may be tolled under Rule 4(b) with the 
"timely" filing by "any party" of one of the following motions: A motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b), to be filed not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment); a motion to alter or amend the judgment or findings (Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(b) and 59, to be filed/served "not later than 10 days after entry of judgment"); or a 
motion for a new trial (Utah R. Civ. P. 59, to be served "not later than 10 days after entry 
of the judgment"; Utah R. Crim. P. 24, to be made within 10 days after sentencing). 
In the event a party files a timely motion under one of the rules identified above, 
the time for filing a notice of appeal will begin to run from the entry of the order granting 
or denying that motion. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (2002). An untimely motion for a new trial 
or to amend the judgment will not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. See 
Bonneville Billing & Collection v. Torres. 2000 UT App 338, ^ [3, 15 P.3d 112. 
2. Once a Party Files a Notice of Appeal the Trial Court Is Divested of 
Jurisdiction and May Not Make Material Changes to the Judgment. That Is, the 
Trial Court Is Limited to Correcting Clerical Errors and Enforcing Existing 
Orders/Judgments. 
Once a timely notice of appeal is filed, the trial court's powers in the matter are 
limited. The trial court may retain jurisdiction over the case as provided by the rules. See 
Utah R. Civil P. 60(b) (2002) (allowing trial court to consider a motion for relief filed 3 
months after entry of judgment); Utah R. App. P. 8 (2002) (providing that trial court must 
consider motion to stay as it relates to an appeal); White v. State. 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 
1990). It may correct clerical errors to ensure that the written judgment will correspond 
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to the order of the court. See Frost v. District Court, 83 P.2d 737, 740 (Utah 1938); 
Garrison v. Davis, 54 P.2d 439,443 (U h 1936); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 
1988) (recognizing that trial court may correct clerical error after judgment is entered); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) (2002); Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) (clerical errors may be corrected at 
any time).2 And it may continue to enforce its original judgments. See Cheves v. 
Williams, 1999 UT 86, ffll 45-48, 993 P.2d 191 (trial court has continuing jurisdiction to 
enforce its judgments); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding that trial court retains jurisdiction over a probationer for the "limited purpose of 
enforcing" the original judgment/order), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). 
Indeed, once the notice of appeal is filed, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction 
over the matter; jurisdiction transfers to the appellate court. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, f 39, 37 P.3d 1073 (finding that defendant's notice of appeal filed before the trial court 
ruled on a pending motion divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter) (citing 
Hi-Countrv Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 
1996) (holding that filing notice of appeal "divests the trial court of jurisdiction and 
transfers it to the appellate court")); see also State v. Allen, 239 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Neb. 
2 A clerical mistake exists if the judge pronounces judgment, and the recorded document 
fails to accurately reflect the judge's pronouncements. See Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 
401, 402 (Utah 1984) (ruling that a mistake made in rendering the judgment is not 
clerical, while a mistake made in recording the judgment is clerical); Meagher v. Equity 
Oil Co, 299 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah 1956) (if order prepared by counsel does not properly 
reflect judge's ruling, trial court may correct the error as a clerical mistake); Lorrah, 761 
P.2d at 1389-90. In this case, the state was not seeking to have a "clerical" mistake 
corrected in the judgment. 
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1976) (finding any order entered by the district court "subsequent to the vesting of the 
jurisdiction" in the appellate court is void because the appellate court and the district 
court "should not exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the same case"). Thus, after the 
notice is filed, the trial court may not take any action that would change or modify the 
judgment in any substantive or material respect, since that court lacks jurisdiction to take 
such action. See Bisner. 2001 UT 99, ^ [39; Allen. 239 N.W.2d at 274. 
3. Where the Trial Court Did Not Impose Restitution Against Smith in the 
Original Judgment the Entry of an Order to that Effect on September 26 
Constituted a Material Change to the Judgment. The Trial Court Lacked 
Jurisdiction to Enter the September 26 Order After Smith Filed the Timely Notice 
of Appeal. 
Under Utah law, the imposition of restitution against a defendant is material and 
substantial, where a restitution order is the equivalent of a legal or civil judgment and is 
enforceable under the rules of civil procedure. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(iv) 
(1999), see State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 653-54 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). A restitution 
order survives death, State v. Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 536-37 (Utah 1993), and may 
not be dischargeable in bankruptcy. State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611,612 (Utah 1985). 
According to Utah statutory law and case law, when restitution is imposed against 
a defendant, he may be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (1999). The evidentiary hearing ensures due process, where the 
defendant may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and he may examine and 
challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which the 
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restitution award is based. See State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994) 
(recognizing due process at sentencing hearings); Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715. 
fa) The trial court did not impose restitution against Smith in the Original 
Judgment 
In this case, the trial court did not order restitution in connection with the Original 
Judgment. Indeed, the trial court sentenced Smith to a suspended prison term, and 
ordered him to serve 36 months probation. The court ordered Smith to pay a fine and sur-
charge totaling $5,108; to cooperate with the Utah State Tax Commission in completing 
tax returns; and to serve 500 hours of community service. The trial court imposed those 
particular conditions against Smith in the Original Judgment as part of probation. The 
trial court entered the Original Judgment on September 7. .001. (R. 861-63.) 
(b) The state requested the imposition of restitution for the first time in the post-
judgment September 21 motion. 
On September 21, approximately two weeks after the trial court entered the 
Original Judgment, the state filed and served a post-judgment motion entitled, "Motion to 
Clarify Sentencing Order." In the motion, the state asked the trial court for the first time 
to impose restitution against Smith as part of sentencing. The motion stated the 
following: 
Comes Now, the State of Utah, by and through Mark W. Baer, Assistant Attorney 
General and hereby request [sic] that the Court in the above cited case clarify the 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment Order entered in the above cited case. In 
support thereof, the State notes as follows: 
* * * 
3. [sic] No restitution amount appears in the Judgment/Sentence in this case. 
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2. [sic] However; as part of the sentencing request, the State had asked for a 
criminal restitution order in the minimum amount of $6,105.94, which amount 
represents the amount that the defendant owed as of the investigation of his case in 
August, 1999. The State renews that request at this time and ask[s] that it be 
memorialized as part of the record in this case. 
(R. 881-882; see also id. at ^ [6(4U 
Contrary to the prosecutor's representations in the September 21 motion, the state 
did not raise the issue of restitution during the original sentencing proceedings, the state 
did not ask for restitution in any amount during those proceedings, and the state did not 
request that the trial court impose restitution in connection with sentencing. (R. 959.) 
In fact, at sentencing the state asked the trial court to "follow the recommendations 
of AP&P" (R. 959:16, 18), to impose a one-year jail sentence, to require Smith's 
cooperation with the Utah State Tax Commission in filing past tax returns, to impose a 
fine against Smith, and to order Smith to community service. (See R. 929:18, 24, 28.) 
While the state made certain particular requests at the original sentencing, it specifically 
did not request the imposition of restitution. 
As for Adult Probation and Parole (ffAP&P"), that agency recommended that 
Smith be remanded "to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve a term of 
incarceration at the Utah State Prison" for the second and third degree felony offenses. 
(R. 750, page 7.) AP&P also stated the following regarding restitution: 
RESTITUTION: No restitution appears to be owing at this time, however, if the 
defendant does file an Income Tax Return for 1995, there may be an amount owed 
to the State of Utah. 
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(R. 750, page 2.)3 In the end, "[n]o restitution amount appear[ed] in the 
Judgment/Sentence in this case" (R. 882), because none was requested at sentencing. 
Given the proceedings, the state's "Motion to Clarify Sentencing Order" may be 
more properly characterized as a motion to alter or amend. The state's motion requested 
a material change to the conditions of probation, and a substantive addition to the 
Original Judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 81(e); see also Bairv Axiom Design. 
2001 UT 20, T1J9-10,20 P.3d 388 (this Court will disregard the label of a motion and 
consider its content); see also Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 1064-
65 (Ui I 1991) (same). Such a motion is governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(c) Where the state 's motion was untirr V. it did not toll the time for filing the 
notice of appeal In t -at regard, the notice of appeal divested the trial court of 
jurisdiction to consia the state's request for an order of restitution. 
Pursuant to Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to alter or amend 
the judgment "shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 81(e) (2002). The language of Rule 59(e) is mandatory. If a motion 
to alter/amend is filed in an untimely manner, "the trial court's only alternative is to deny 
the motion." Burgers, 652 P.2d at 1321. 
3 In a letter to AP&P, the prosecutor stated, 
As a supplement to the earlier letter in this case, the lead investigator in this case, 
Dorothy Akins, reports that the criminal investigation unit's calculation with 
respect to the amount of taxes, penalty and interest owed by this defendant - for 
1995 alone - was $ 7,162.64, as of April 9, 2001. 
(R. 750, attached letter.) The letter shows that the state was aware of an amount in taxes 
allegedly owing by the defendant. Nevertheless, the state specifically did not request 
(either in the letter or otherwise) the imposition of restitution in the case. (See R. 959.) 
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The language in Burgers is sound policy. The Utah rules of procedure are 
designed to provide regularity in court proceedings. Such regularity allows the trial court 
and parties to rely on the finality of a judgment after it is entered. If the trial court 
neglects to follow the rules by allowing a party to file an untimely motion to amend, the 
process creates uncertainty and unwarranted, extended litigation in the matter. In that 
regard, a post-judgment motion must be timely filed to ensure reliability in the process, 
fairness to the parties, and finality in the judgment. 
The timeliness of a post-judgment motion to amend is relevant for another reason: 
It postpones the time for filing a notice of appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(b). "The serving of 
such a [timely] motion suspends from running the one-month period in which a party 
usually has to file a notice of appeal." Burgers. 652 P.2d at 1321. In this case, if the state 
had filed a motion to amend within 10 days of judgment, its motion would have tolled the 
time for filing a notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3, 4 (2002). Smith would have 
been required to wait until resolution of the state's motion before he could file an 
effective notice of appeal. See U-M Invs. v. Rav. 658 P.2d 1186, 1187 (Utah 1982); 
Robinson & Wells v. Warren. 669 P.2d 844, 845 (Utah 1983) (stating that the time for 
filing a notice of appeal runs from the date of the order granting or denying the timely 
motion under Rule 59); Regan v. Blount. 1999 UT App 154, f4, 978 P.2d 1051; 
Anderson v. Schwendiman. 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah Ct App. 1988) (filing of a timely 
post-judgment motion as listed in Rule 4 suspends the finality of the judgment, and any 
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notice of appeal filed prior to the entry of an order disposing of that motion is not 
effective to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court). 
Here, the state's untimely motion did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
Thus, the appeals clock was running against Smith. 
Stated another way, in this case, the state filed its September 21 motion for 
restitution more than 10 days after entry of the Original Judgment. Due to the late filing, 
the . late ran the risk that the trial court would be divested of jurisdiction before the 
motion could be resolved; Smith was already well into e period ibr filing the notice of 
appeal. The pros*. :utor apparently recognized the timing issue and immediately followed 
his motion with a proposed order before Smith could even respond to the motion. (R. 
881-83,896-97.) 
After the state filed the untimely motion, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 
888-89.) Smith's notice divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a ruling in the 
matter. Bisnen 2001 UT 99, ^ [39. Notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction, the trial court 
granted the untimely motion and amended the Original Judgment in a material respect: it 
imposed restitution as an additional condition of probation. That was improper. 
The September 26 Order was improper for two reasons: First, under Burgers, 652 
P.2d at 1321, the trial court's "only alternative" was to deny the state's September 21 
motion as untimely. Id. The trial court erred when it failed to deny the untimely motion. 
Second, under Bisnen 2001 UT 99, ^ 39, Smith's September 25 notice of appeal was 
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properly and timely filed. It effectively divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the 
September 26 Order of restitution and to make a material addition to the Original 
Judgment. 
For those reasons, Smith requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
September 26 Order of restitution. The order is null and void, where the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the state's untimely motion after Smith filed the notice of appeal. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY IMPOSED AN 
ADDITIONAL CONDITION ON SENTENCING WITHOUT AFFORDING 
SMITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE MATTER. 
As set forth above, in this case the state filed a post-judgment motion on 
September 21, 2001, asking the court, among other things, to impose restitution against 
Smith. The motion was filed 14 days after entry of the Original Judgment. On 
September 26,2001, the trial court entered an order granting the state's motion. The 
court entered the September 26 Order without first hearing from Smith on the matter. 
That was improper. 
According to Utah law, restitution may be imposed as part of sentencing. Lipskv. 
608 P.2d at 1244 (as part of sentencing, a court may order the defendant to pay 
restitution); see supra, Point I.A., herein. Before a trial court may impose a sentence on a 
defendant, the court "shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to 
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why 
sentence should not be imposed.1' Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). The plain and mandatory 
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language of Rule 22(a) places an obligation on the trial covt to afford the defendant the 
opportunity to speak at sentencing and to present informal. * elevant to atencing 
considerations. 
In addition, the due process clause of both the state a federal constitutions 
entitles a defendant to be present at sentencing. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah 
Const, art. I, § 7. Due process "requires that a sentencing judge act i reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 1071 (Utah 1993) (cites omitted); State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115, 
118 (Utah 1985) (Art. 1, § 7 of Utah Constitution requires sentencing judge to act on 
reliable, relevant information in exercising discretion in sentencing); Lipskv. 608 P.2d at 
1248-49; Gomez. 887 P.2d at 854-55. That means, the defendant must be given the 
opportunity to be heard. 
Also, the right to be present at sentencing is supported by sound policy 
considerations. See United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D.C. Cal. 1982); 
State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209 (Ariz. 1983). "[T]he common law has traditionally 
required that the defendant be present at his sentencing." Turner, 532 F.Supp. at 915; see 
also United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("The 
requirement that the defendant be present when sentence is passed has deep common law 
origins1"). Presence is of critical importance to sentencing not only because it allows a 
adge to be presented with information needed for a full sentencing hearing, but it also 
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allows the judge to question the defendant about pertinent matters. "It is only when the 
defendant is before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." 
Fettis. 664 P.2d at 209. The Utah rules and due process requirements work together to 
ensure fairness at sentencing. 
In this case, the trial court entered the September 26 Order without allowing Smith 
the opportunity to speak to the issue of restitution. That was unfair. The order violated 
Smith's constitutional and statutory rights. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); Johnson. 856 
P.2d at 1071: Howell. 707 P.2d at 118; Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (1999) ("At the time 
of sentencing, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence"). 
To be clear, the trial court in this case allowed Smith to be heard at the original 
sentencing hearing on issues that were raised and addressed in connection with entry of 
the Original Judgment. (See R. 959; 861-63.) That was appropriate. Since the state did 
not raise the issue of restitution and the trial court did not impose restitution as part of 
sentencing, there was no reason for Smith to address the matter at the original hearing. 
(See R. 959.) 
Thereafter, the trial court imposed restitution in the September 26 Order without 
giving Smith an opportunity to make a statement, present information in mitigation of 
such an order, or object to the proceedings. In fact, the trial court entered the order just 5 
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days after the state filed the untimely motion seeking imposition of restitution. (R. 881-
83; 896-97.) Smith was not given sufficient opportunity even to make a meaningful 
objection to the motion before the order was entered. See i.e., Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-
501(1)(B) (rules governing civil practice provide a party opposing a motion with 10 days 
to respond); 4-504 (rules governing civil practice require a party submitting a proposed 
order to the court to first serve the proposed order on the opposing party, before being 
submitted to the court; the opposing party has five days to object to the proposed order). 
In this case the trial court imposed a restitution sentence without giving Smith an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter. That was unlawful. Pursuant to Rule 22(e) (see 
supra. Point I.A., herein), Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the restitution 
provision of the September 26 Order.4 
4 This Court may vacate the September 26 Order without resorting to Rule 22(e). That is, 
Smith filed an "Objection to [the state's] Proposed Order." (R. 898-907.) The Objection 
adequately served to preserve the allocution issue for appeal. 
In the objection, Smith argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
state's motion in various respects, and it should summarily deny the state's request 
without a hearing. (R. 898.) Indeed, as set forth above (see supra. Point L3., herein), the 
trial court should have summarily denied the state's request for restitution without any 
further hearing on the matter. Since the trial court did not summarily deny the request, 
Smith was entitled to a hearing. 
Also, in the "Objection to Proposed Order," Smith made reference to a "Notice of 
Deficiency" that he received "from the Tax Commission regarding taxes due for 1995." 
(R. 901-02.) Smith disagreed with the amount in taxes claimed by the state and he noted 
his right to a "Division Conference" in connection with the matter. (R. 902.) Where the 
amount in alleged taxes set forth in the "Notice of Deficiency" related directly to the 
restitution requested by the prosecutor in the September 21 motion, Smith's reference to 
a "Division Conference" in the objection should have alerted the trial court to the fact 
that Smith disputed the amount in taxes claimed by the state, and he was entitled to a 
hearing. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROVIDE 
SMITH WITH A HEARING ON RESTITUTION UNDER UTAH 
STATUTORY LAW. 
A. PURSUANT TO SECTION 76-3-20 U4¥e\ SMITH WAS ENTITLED TO 
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) provides the following: "If the defendant objects 
to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of 
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(e) (1999) (emphasis added). The "full hearing" provision ensures due process. 
See Stames, 841 P.2d at 715 (recognizing that "full hearing" provision entitles defendant 
to present evidence and cross-examine the other side's witnesses). 
In this case, Smith filed an objection to the post-judgment order. (See Addendum 
D, hereto.) That was all he was required to do under the law to be afforded a full 
restitution hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e). The trial court failed to provide 
Smith with such a hearing. That was improper. Id, 
In considering what constitutes a "full hearing," this Court's decision in State v. 
Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, is instructive. There, defendant pleaded guilty to charges of crimi-
nal mischief and assault, and the victim requested restitution. Thereafter, a restitution 
hearing was scheduled, which the defendant failed to attend for lack of notice. Id. at 713. 
The trial judge ordered restitution against defendant in the amount of $281.89. Id. 
When Defendant Starnes failed to make restitution payments on the judgment, the 
trial judge entered an order to show cause against him and held a hearing. During that 
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proceeding, defendant asked the court to set aside the judgment and to provide a full 
hearing on the restitution award. Id. In response to defendant's request, the trial court 
held two additional hearings (a hearing was held on November 13, 1991 and a hearing 
was held on January 8, 1992), where defendant was able to engage in a limited and 
flustered cross-examination of the victim with respect to the alleged damages suffered, 
and to proffer evidence from his own witnesses. Stames. 841 P.2d at 713-14. The judge 
specifically refused to permit defendant's witnesses to testify. Id at 714. 
After the hearings, the judge increased the amount in restitution to $450. 
Defendant appealed and argued "the trial court denied him his statutory right to a full 
hearing." Id. at 714. On appeal, this Court addressed the matter of the full hearing and 
found that the trial court violated the statute. Specifically, this Court determined that to 
constitute a full hearing, not only was the trial court required to provide defendant with 
the opportunity to review and cross-examine the evidence supporting the amount in 
damages, but also, it was required to allow the defendant to present his evidence at the 
hearing. Id at 715. This Court stated, "Even when the third and fourth hearings are 
combined, however, it is evident that Stames was not afforded a 'full hearing.5 The trial 
court refused to 'hear' Stames's evidence that there was no actual damage. Therefore, 
while Stames was allowed to appear in court, he was denied an opportunity to present his 
evidence." Id at 715. This Court remanded the case for a proper hearing. Id. at 716. 
In this case, Smith objected to the proposed post-judgment order on the basis that 
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the trial court lacked authority to enter it. (R. 898 ("Objection to Proposed Order").) 
Smith informed the trial court that if it denied the state's proposed order "summarily," "no 
hearing" would be needed. (R. 898.) Smith also identified a "Notice of Deficiency" 
from the state tax commission reflecting amounts due in taxes for 1995. (R. 901.) Smith 
disagreed with the amounts and advised the trial court that he had the right to a "Division 
Conference" or a petition on the matter. (R. 902.) Smith's filing constituted an objection 
to restitution. 
Pursuant to the mandatory language of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), Smith was required 
only to object to the proposed order. Thereafter, the trial court was obligated to provide a 
full hearing on the issue of restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e).5 In this case, 
Smith placed the trial court on sufficient notice of his objection and his right to a hearing. 
(R. 902.) The trial court erred in failing to provide an evidentiary hearing on the 
restitution issues. Smith respectfully requests that this Court remand the case for a full 
evidentiary hearing in accordance with Section 76-3-20l(4)(e). 
5 In the event this Court finds that Smith's objection was insufficient to constitute a 
request for a hearing pursuant to Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), this Court nevertheless should 
vacate the restitution order, where the trial court failed to provide Smith with an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter before it entered the order. See supra. Point II. 
That is, the trial court entered the order in this case only five days after the state filed the 
untimely motion. The hasty manner in which the court granted the state's restitution 
request prevented Smith from filing a meaningful objection to the issues. On that basis, 
this Court may vacate the September 26 Order. See American Vending Servs.. Inc. v. 
Morse. 881 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (finding that trial court erred in 
entering an order before both parties could be properly heard on the matter). 
25 
B. IN ORDERING RESTITUTION, THE JUDGE FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
MANDATORY FACTORS SET FORTH AT S 76-3-20 U8¥eV 
In ordering restitution, the trial judge failed in this matter to take into consideration 
the mandatory factors set forth in Section 76-3-20l(8)(c). Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) 
provides the following: 
In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (1999). The statute also requires the trial court to make 
a record of its reasons for ordering restitution. Id. at -201(4)(d)(i). 
Utah case law supports that the trial court must make a record of its consideration 
of the specific factors set forth at § 76-3-20 l(8)(c). "We read this requirement [at section 
76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i)] to mean that after taking into account the factors listed in section 76-3-
201(4)(c) [now subsection (8)(c)], the trial court must take the additional step of explicitly 
noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the detailed factors 
listed in the statute." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997). Also, "in 
determining whether or not to order restitution, the [trial] court is required to consider the 
financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
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impose, the ability of the defendant to pay restitution, the rehabilitative effect of the 
payment of restitution, and other relevant circumstances." Department of Employment 
Sec, of Indus. Com'n of Utah v. Ninth Circuit Court in and for Cedar Citv Dept.. 718 
P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 1986): see also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028 (Utah 1996) 
(in ordering restitution, the Board is required not only to consider statutory factors, but 
also to make a record of the reasons for ordering restitution); Miller v. State. 932 P.2d 
618, 621 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Board is required to consider factors in ordering 
restitution); Stames, 841 P.2d at 715 n.3 (court must consider defendant's financial 
resources in determining restitution); State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 936-37 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (the trial court "must declare reasons within the statutory framework for 
awarding or denying restitution"), revfd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, the record is silent with respect to the mandatory statutory factors set 
forth at § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) and the reasons for the court's order of restitution. There is no 
indication that in ordering restitution the trial judge considered Smith's financial 
resources, the burden that payment of restitution would impose on Smith with regard to 
other obligations, and Smith's ability to pay restitution. (R. 896-97, |^4.)6 
6 According to the record here, the Honorable Raymond Uno presided over the 
September 7 sentencing hearing and entered the Original Judgment in the case. (R. 959.) 
Thereafter, the Honorable Michael Burton signed the September 26 Order of restitution. 
(R. 896-97.) There is no indication in the record that Judge Burton reviewed any 
information regarding Smith before signing the September 26 Order, or that he made any 
assessment of the statutory factors as required by law before imposing restitution against 
Smith. 
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In: much as the trial court failed to make a record of the reasons for ordering 
restitutio! vithin the statutory framewor u of Section 76-3-201 (8)(c), (see Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i); Starnes. 841 P.2d at 715 n.3), the September 26 Order of 
restitution is unlawful. 
Indeed, consideration of the factors set forth at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) supports 
that restitution was inappropriate. Smith was financially destitute. At the time of 
sentencing, he was unemployed. (R. 750, Presentence Report, 5.) Smith had debts but no 
monthly income, and he was bankrupt in 1998. (Id. at 5.) Also, during sentencing in this 
case, Smith was ordered to serve 500 hours of community service and to pay more than 
$5,000 in fines and surcharges. The financial obligations and community service 
certainly would have an effect on Smith's ability to pay restitution. 
If the trial court had considered the factors under Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c), it likely 
would not have ordered restitution in the amount of $6,105.94 as requested by the state. 
Under the relevant factors, Smith did not have the financial resources or the ability to pay 
restitution. Also, restitution would impose a burden on Smith's ability to perform 
community service, provide for his family, and pay the fines and surcharges. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(c). The trial court erred in ordering restitution in this case.7 
7 This Court may reach the issues raised in this Point III under Rule 22(e), where 
restitution was imposed in an illegal manner. The trial judge here failed to comply with § 
76-3-20l(8)(c) and (4)(d)(i), and to consider the mandatory statutory factors before 
ordering restitution against Smith. See supra. Point I.A., herein. 
In the alternative, the trial court committed plain error when it failed to consider 
the statutory factors set forth in Section 76-3-201(8)(c), and when it failed to make a 
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Smith respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order of restitution, or in the 
alternative remand the matter in order that Smith may be permitted a full hearing, 
including proper consideration of the factors set forth at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3) (1990) [now § 76-3-201(4)], expressly requires the 
trial court to make its reasons for granting restitution a part of the record. The 
statute further requires that the trial court consider the defendant's financial 
resources and the rehabilitative effect of the restitution when determining whether 
to award restitution. Corresponding findings should therefore be made on remand. 
State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App. 1991) (findings should follow the 
statutory framework). 
Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715 n. 3. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Smith respectfully requests that this Court enter an 
order vacating the trial court's September 26 Order of restitution. 
record of its reasons for ordering restitution. To establish plain error, appellant must 
show, "(0 An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict 
is undermined." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
An obvious error exists when the trial court fails to comply with the mandatory 
language of a statute. State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937, 940-41 (Utah 1996). Also, where 
prior case law has specifically required the trial court to consider the factors at subsection 
(8)(c), the trial court's failure to comply with the law constitutes plain error. See Dept. 
Empl. Sec, of Indus. Corn's of Utah. 718 P.2d at 784; Miller. 932 P.2d at 621; 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234. There is no indication here that the trial court complied 
with subsections (8)(c) and (4)(d)(i) in ordering restitution. (R. 896-97; see also supra. 
note 6, herein.) Thus, error exists. Because Utah statutory and case law requires the court 
to make a record and to consider the factors in determining restitution, the error is 
obvious. Finally, there is a reasonable likelihood that Smith would not have been ordered 
to pay the full amount in restitution if the court had considered the statutory factors. 
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SUBMITTED this/S"davof cyy* ,2002 
V^4 
LINDA M. JONEJ 
RON FUJINO 
Standby Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand delivered an 
original and 1 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and V copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 
140854, this /ft*, day of ^ . j ,2002. 
1/jrfA. ISA* 
)A M. JONES 
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of 
Appeals Court as indicated above this day of , 2002. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS HOWARD SMITH, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991920225 FS 
Judge: RAYMOND S. UNO 
Date: September 7, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Prosecutor: MARK W BAER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RONALD S FUJINO 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 16, 1943 
Video 
Tape Number: 1:08 
CHARGES 
1. TAX EVASION - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
2. TAX EVASION - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Darro 1 
Case No: 991920225 
Date: Sep 07, 2001 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT / CONS EJTTIVE NOTE 
Counts are to run concurrent. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fj.ne: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
Charge # 2 Fine: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge: 
Total Principal Due: 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 3500.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to cooperate with the Tax Commission and file returns 
for all years requested. 
Defendant is to make any future tax filings. 
Defendant is to complete 500 hours community service doing service 
approved by APPD. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $3500 which includes the surcharge. 
$1000.00 
$0.00 
$459.46 
$1000.00 
$2500.00 
$0.00 
$1148.65 
$2500.00 
$3500.00 
$0 
$1608.11 
$3500.00 
Plus Interest 
Paae 2 
Case No: 991920225 
Date: Sep 07, 2001 
A review hearing is set for March 15, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. 
Defendant is to keep the State informed of his address at all 
times. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/15/2002 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W37 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Dated this day of / \x 
RAYMO: 
District 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabili^J^^^^yW^J6ividuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary1 ^ uTflmunicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days 
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is 
(801)238-7300. 
Darra *3 ( 1 act- ) 
ADDENDUM B 
FILED DISTRICT GOUft'f 
Third Judicial District 
By: MARK W. BAER #5440 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666 
Attorney General 
Attorney For The State of Utah 
Heber Wells Building 
PMB 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)366-0199 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THOMAS H. SMITH 
DOB: 01/16/43 
Defendant. | 
ORDER 
Criminal No. 011002002-TS 
ORDER 
The defendant is hereby Ordered as follows in addition to anything already 
ordered in this case: 
(1) File all past Utah State returns from 1990 to present; 
(2) That the filings must account for income and expenses of the defendant; 
(3) That the defendant must present supporting documentation with such returns; 
Deputy Clerk 
5 
(4) That Restitution is hereby set at $6,105.94, for purposes of this criminal case only, 
but that this amount does not bind the Utah State Tax Commission, and further only related 
to tax year 1995. 
DONE IN COURT this ^ day of 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed s true and exact copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Ron Fujino 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Asoociation 
Stand-By Counsel for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas H. Smith 
1301 WHBR 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
MarkW. Baer 
Assistant Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
PMB 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM C 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chanc or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making tl applica-
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special 
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part 
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in 
uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceed-
ings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of 
any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Application to small claims. These rules shall not apply to small 
proceedings except as expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board 
or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing 
from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an 
administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or 
inconsistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction'' includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. < 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil ppnalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted ofcriminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a hen when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make mles permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal tirst and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance wi i Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
5) (a) In addition any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
,6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumst rices in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to r at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing, 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8)(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection-] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of l i e United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way ^ridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec, 3. [Disqualification to hold office-] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, orasan officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereoi. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but ail such del .s, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Thomas Smith, 
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Case No. 991920225 
Objection to Proposed Order 
Defendant, Thomas Smith, hereby responds, objects to and moves the Court to 
summarily deny the Plaintiffs proposed order on grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
grant the relief requested (no hearing is needed) and sets forth his reasons below. 
FACTS 
1. Defendant was charged with one count of tax evasion a third degree felony for the year 
1995. 
2. Defendant was charged with one count of tax evasion a second degree felony for the 
year 1995. 
3. Defendant was not charged with any tax crime whatsoever for any year other than 1995. 
4. Defendant's conviction was only for the year 1995 and for no other year. 
Objection to order 
Case No 991920225 
page 1 of 11 pages 
5. No evidence or testimony was presented at trial regarding any filing requirement for any 
year other than 1995, nor was the jury asked to determine a filing requirement for any 
year other than 1995. 
6. Therefore, there was no determination regarding any filing requirement for any year 
other than 1995. 
7. Plaintiff seeks an summary order requiring Defendant to file tax returns for years other 
than the year 1995. 
DISCUSSION 
The only year at issue in the instant matter is 1995. Plaintiff had more than ample 
opportunity to bring forth charges that Defendant had a filing requirement for years other than 
1995 and to set forth the facts on which Plaintiff believed that Defendant was required to file. 
Plaintiff did not bring forth such charges, nor did Plaintiff set forth such facts at trial. 
Therefore, Plaintiff is estopped from bringing forth such request as a summary proceeding and 
the Court is estopped from granting such request. Further, because such facts are not before 
the Court, the Court lacks subject matter and in personum jurisdiction over such matters. 
By making the request that the Court order Defendant to file such returns for years other 
than 1995, Plaintiff is asking the Court to relieve Plaintiff of its requirement to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant is required to file for a year other than 1995. The Court lacks 
jurisdiction to make such an order in the absence of a determination by a trier of fact that such 
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returns are required. 
The most important issues established in the instant matter are that whether or not the 
Defendant is required to file a tax return and pay a tax is an issue of fact not an issue of law. 
To determine issues of fact requires a trial at which plaintiff sets forth the evidence and 
testimony and a trier of fact makes a determination on the basis of the facts set forth, and that 
failure to file a tax return and pay a tax is not a civil matter, but, is a criminal matter which 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Plaintiff, by not bringing a charge of failing 
to file and pay for years other than 1995 has forfeited its right to require Defendant to file and 
pay for years other than 1995. 
Not withstanding such requirement, Plaintiff seeks to circumvent Defendant's right to 
due process and to have a trier of fact make a determination that Defendant is required to file 
for years other than 1995, by asking the Court to summarily order the Defendant to file tax 
returns for years other than that which the Defendant stands convected of. If the Court has 
jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file for years other than 1995, then the Court 
had jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file for 1995 and no trial would have been 
necessary. The Court has no such authority. 
Years ago the State of Utah issued a Writ of Mandate to individuals that the Tax 
Commission felt should file tax returns (a civil summary proceeding requiring a lower civil 
evidentiary requirement). In this process the court would summarily order the individual to file 
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and jail him/her for contempt if such return was not filed. This procedure was found to be 
defective, in that it constituted a denial of the individuals right to due process, because as 
established by the instant matter failure to file is a criminal matter. It cannot be determined on 
the basis of a civil proceeding and the lower civil evidentiary requirement. Nor, can it be 
determined on the basis of a summary proceeding in the absence of a trial. The dett nination 
of the requirement to file is highly fact sensitive. Since the requirement to file is criminal 
proceeding, it requires a criminal adjudication and a criminal evidentiary requirement. As 
stated above the Defendant is not charged with nor has the Defendant been found beyond a 
reasonable doubt, by a trier of fact, to be required to file for any year other than 1995. In the 
absence of such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of fact, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file returns for any year other than 1995. 
Therefore, numbers 1,2,3, must be denied for lack jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Annotated 59-7-517(2) requires that before any proceeding against a 
taxpayer is commenced the taxpayer must be noticed. The Court should take judicial notice 
that prior to trial no notice of a tax due was sent to Defendant, nor was any exhibit or testimony 
presented to the jury that a notice was sent. The attached Notice of Deficiency, dated 
September 20,2001, is the first notice the Defendant has received from the Tax Commission 
regarding taxes due for 1995. Thus the instant case was commenced in violation of Title 59-7-
517(2) and the Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or 
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to order the Defendant to do anything. Pursuant to the attached Notice of Deficiency the Court 
lacks jurisdiction to order the Defendant to file for the year 1995 because such order would 
circumvent the Defendants due process rights to appeal the deficiency as noted on the 
attached Notice of Deficiency accordingly. 
As to item number 4, the aforesaid Notice of Deficiency alleges a deficiency of 
$8,004.39 for the year 1995. The Court will note that said Deficiency notices the Defendant 
that he has the right to 1) Request a Division Conference or 2) to file a Petition for 
Redetermination within 30 days of the mailing date of this letter. If the Court were to grant the 
proposed order as to item number 4 such order would circumvent and deny Defendant his 
appeal rights as granted by instruction number 2 on the Deficiency Notice. Further, such order 
would negate the Notice of Deficiency in its entirety and the Defendant's right to due process 
under the terms and conditions of the Notice of Deficiency. Additionally, the issuance of the 
attached Notice of Deficiency takes jurisdiction to determine the amount of tax due away from 
this Court and places it squarely within the jurisdiction of State Tax Commission appeals 
division. 
Thus, as shown above the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the proposed order and/or 
to proceed or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or to order the Defendant to do anything 
and must therefore and can SUMMARILY deny the proposed order in its entirety and no 
hearing is needed. 
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Dated September 26,2001 
Is! Thomas Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing by fax on the following: 
Third District Court; Mark W. Bear Assistant Attorney General, 160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114; Ron Fujino, 424 IE. 500 S. Ste 300, Salt Lake City, UT, 84111. 
Dated: September 26, 2001 
Is! Thomas Smith 
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UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION STV5T? 
NOTICE OF AUDIT CHANGE CONTINUED 
DO JSfO? MAIL THIS BLANK COUPON. 
KAIL IX THE COUPON CONTAIN IKG 
PREPRINTED ACCOUNT, FILING PERIOD 
AND AKOUNT ON REVERSE S I D E . 
S£?TD6£R 30, 200! 
STATUTORY NOTICE 0* ESTIMATED 1MC0ME TAX 
PAYMENT WE GATE: OCTOBER 22, 2001 
THOMAS & MARIA SMITH TAX T*PE: INCCML 
1301 UHBR SOCIAL SECURITY Ntfr8Eft: S 2 3 - W - W 3 
VERML l/T 84078 TAX YEAR: 1995 
fCN; 36*391448026 
I f you wtsfc to m e ^ r e about th is return please do SC within 30 days cf We date of th is TOtice, or you aay f i l e a correct 
return. Pteas* note that a prorcpt response is needed in order to protect your appeal n g n t s . These appeal rignts art 
outlined on the £>adc of t*iis notice. 
Additional penalties and interest w i n be assessed i f payment is not received by the "payment due" date shown aocve. 
Additional penalty of ten percent of the additional tax due <yr $20 whichever *s greater wV\ Oe assessed i f paynent is net 
r e i v e d Oy the "parent due" date shown above. PLEASE M YOUR SOCIAL SECURiTY NUK3ER ON YGU3 CHECK. For pays>ent 
infonwtion contact the Collection Division by cal l ing (801) 297-7703. 
AJDIUNG DIVISION 
Becky McKenzfe CPA 
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